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It is well established that the primary function of the Bill of Rights is to
preserve essential liberties for citizens of the United States.  Cornerstone
rights such as freedom of speech derive directly from the  rst ten
amendments.  The protection of citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures by government agents also originates from the Bill of Rights.  The
Fourth Amendment establishes:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or a rmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
As one scholar noted, the Fourth Amendment “makes plain, perhaps more
than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, that the Constitution does not
tolerate the tactics of a police state.”  Unfortunately, U.S. border agents act
with impunity, employing totalitarian, police state tactics by performing
unconstitutional searches and seizures on a daily basis.  Although the right
to be secure against unreasonable government intrusion is a vital freedom
enjoyed by American citizens on the interior of the country, its sanctity is
being violated at the border in an area dubbed the “Constitution-free zone.”
Traditionally, border searches are exempt from Fourth Amendment
protections in a doctrine known  ttingly as the border search exception.
This exception exists “pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into
[the U.S.]” and is “reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that [the searches]
occur at the border.”  In order to keep pace with rapidly advancing
technology, some federal courts have explicitly extended the exception to
electronic devices, holding that “reasonable suspicion is not needed for
customs o cials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage
devices at the border.”  This is particularly concerning because in today’s
world, smartphones, tablets, and laptops have rapidly shifted from a luxury to
a daily necessity.  The Supreme Court recognized that “modern cell phones
. . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human
anatomy.”
The practice of searching electronic devices at the border has raised serious
Constitutional concerns.  Statistics for the 2017 calendar year released by
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) show that 30,200
international travelers, both inbound and outbound, were subjected to
electronic device searches.  This is roughly a 37% increase from 2016.
CBP insists that “the need for border searches of electronic devices is driven















laws in this digital age.”  Many disagree with these border searches, and in
September 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)  led a lawsuit
in federal court “on behalf of 11 travelers whose smartphones and laptops
were searched without warrants at the U.S. border.”  The ACLU’s position is
that Fourth Amendment protections should extend to border searches,
“especially when it comes to electronic devices like smartphones and
laptops.”
The most recent development in border search exception precedent was
decided by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman.  In Cotterman,
the court ruled that a forensic search of electronic devices at the border
requires reasonable suspicion.  Forensic examination of computers is “a
powerful tool capable of unlocking password-protected  les, restoring
deleted material, and retrieving images viewed on web sites.”  While this
decision is certainly a step in the right direction, it fails to address the
problem of unwarranted cursory searches of electronic devices. A cursory
search, or “basic search” according to CBP, is any search that does not
require “external equipment, through a wired or wireless connection, to an
electronic device not merely to gain access to the device, but to review, copy,
and/or analyze its contents.”  Cursory searches expose your electronic
device’s texts, emails, photos, internet history, and other personal
information. This Note will argue that the reasonable suspicion standard
currently applied to investigative searches of electronic devices at the border
should be extended to cursory searches due to the clear violation of digital
privacy and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Part II of this Note will discuss basic Fourth Amendment principles and the
origins of the border search exception with accompanying case law. Part III
will unpack the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Cotterman
and analyze the current situation of the border search exception. Part IVwill
illustrate arguments against extending reasonable suspicion to cursory
searches of electronic devices at the border while presenting rebuttals to
each of those arguments. Speci cally, this Note argues that, in United States
v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit should have extended the reasonable
suspicion standard to cursory searches of electronic devices at the border.
Part V lays out possible solutions to the issue and the impacts that might
result from those solutions. Part VI concludes this Note.
II.  A Brief Legal History of the Border Search Exception
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches
and seizures unless the government has secured a warrant upon probable









Amendment violation is suppression of the illegally seized evidence”  via
the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is “a deterrent sanction that bars
the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth
Amendment violation.”  The key factor when applying the exclusionary rule
is whether or not the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area searched.  In his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
Justice Harlan laid out the twofold test for determining whether an individual
has an expectation of privacy in a certain area: “ rst that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections are common in the U.S. legal
system such as the doctrines of plain view  and search incident to arrest.
 These exceptions demonstrate the willingness of courts to mold the plain
text of the Amendment to  t speci c situations. For example, in Carroll v.
United States, the Supreme Court ruled that warrantless searches of vehicles
were permitted as long as the o cer performing the search had probable
cause.  The relevant language asserts that “[t]ravelers may be so stopped
in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled
to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in.”  This language laid the initial groundwork for the border search
doctrine and is often cited in cases utilizing the exception.
Authority for the border search exception derives from several landmark
Supreme Court decisions.  In justifying the border search doctrine, the
Court has stated that the “exception is grounded in the recognized right of
the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the
Constitution, who and what may enter the country.”  In particular, “the
Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and
effects is at its zenith at the international border.”  The Court has explicitly
stated that “the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the
interior.”  However, despite the broad language of border search exception
cases, the Court has also implied that the Fourth Amendment might impose
limits on border searches, but it has never de nitively spoken on the subject.
 Courts must balance “the sovereign’s interests at the border” with the
Fourth Amendment rights of the individual contesting the search.
While the Supreme Court has addressed searches of persons  and
vehicles  at the border, it has never directly ruled on the issue of searches
of personal electronic devices at the border. The law on border searches of
electronic devices derives mostly from the Courts of Appeals.  In United
States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit extended the border search exception to



















customs o cials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage
devices at the border.”  Five years later, the Ninth Circuit was called on
again to review the issue of border searches and electronic devices in United
States v. Cotterman.
III.  Cotterman and Beyond
A.  United States v. Cotterman
In United States v. Cotterman, Howard Cotterman and his wife were crossing
the U.S.-Mexico border when he was  agged by the Treasury Enforcement
Communication System for potentially possessing child pornography.
During the search of his vehicle, border agent Antonio Alvarado recovered
and inspected three cameras and two laptops containing personal photos,
along with several password-protected  les.  The Cottermans were set
free; however, suspecting that Mr. Cotterman had child pornography locked
behind password-protection, the agents transported the laptops and
cameras 170 miles to an off-site facility in order to conduct a forensic search
of the devices.  The investigative search revealed hundreds of images of
child pornography behind the password-protected  les on Mr. Cotterman’s
laptop.
After a grand jury indicted Mr. Cotterman for several offenses related to child
pornography,  Mr. Cotterman moved to suppress the evidence claiming
that it was acquired from an unlawful search and seizure violating his Fourth
Amendment rights.  Following lower court proceedings, a divided three
panel Ninth Circuit held that “reasonable suspicion was not required for the
search and that ‘the district court erred in suppressing the evidence lawfully
obtained under border search authority.’”
On rehearing en banc, the court ruled that forensic examination of electronic
devices at the border requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.  The
court explained that “[electronic devices] contain the most intimate details of
our lives:  nancial records, con dential business documents, medical
records and private emails,”  all of which “implicate[ ] the Fourth
Amendment’s speci c guarantee of the people’s right to be secure in their
‘papers.’”  In coming to their conclusion, the majority conceded that
“legitimate concerns about child pornography do not justify unfettered crime-
 ghting searches or an unregulated assault on citizens’ private
information.”  The court stated that “[r]easonable suspicion is a modest,
workable standard that is already applied in the extended border search,
Terry stop, and other contexts.”  Finally, the court reasoned that “[i]ts
application to the forensic examination here will not impede law
enforcement’s ability to monitor and secure our borders or to conduct
















The court applied this standard to Mr. Cotterman’s case and ruled that the
investigative search of his laptop was conducted upon reasonable suspicion
and his “motion to suppress therefore was erroneously granted.”  Although
Mr. Cotterman was unable to suppress the evidence, the court correctly
balanced “the sovereign’s interests at the border” with the Fourth
Amendment rights of the individual contesting the search.  Citing Justice
Scalia, the court explained that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”  However, the court did
not completely overrule Arnold, which rejected the requirement of reasonable
suspicion for both cursory and investigative searches of electronic devices.
 In fact, they explicitly stated that “we have approved a quick look and
uninstructive search of laptops.”  While the court solved the issue of
unreasonable investigative searches, the court is legitimizing the policy that
cursory searches of personal electronic devices do not require reasonable
suspicion.
B.  The Current Situation
As a result of Cotterman, travelers can be con dent that border agents lack
the authority to perform investigative searches of their electronic devices
without reasonable suspicion. This is clearly a win for digital privacy rights.
Unfortunately, the problem of suspicionless cursory searches is still rampant,
as demonstrated by the ACLU, which recently  led a lawsuit against the
Department of Homeland Security challenging border searches of electronic
devices.
The concerning part of electronic device border searches stems from the
fact that these are not isolated incidents. CBP released statistics for 2017
claiming that 30,200 international travelers, inbound and outbound, had their
electronic devices searched.  That is roughly a 37% increase of electronic
devices searched from 2016 to 2017.  CBP argues that national security
outweighs the inconveniences of a small percentage of travelers, but privacy
advocates disagree, stating that “[t]hey see the growth of a surveillance state
eating away civil liberties a mouthful at a time.”
In early January 2018, CBP released a directive that outlined their procedures
related to searching electronic devices at the border.  The directive states
that “[t]he plenary authority of the Federal Government to conduct searches
and inspections of persons and merchandise crossing our nation’s borders is
well-established and extensive; control of the border is a fundamental
principle of sovereignty.”












Border searches of electronic devices may include searches of the information stored on
the device when it is presented for inspection or during its detention by CBP for an
inbound or outbound border inspection. The border search will include an examination of
only the information that is resident upon the device and accessible through the device’s
operating system or through other software, tools or applications.
Further, the directive distinguishes between basic and advanced border
searches, articulating:
In the course of a basic search, with or without suspicion, an O cer may examine an
electronic device and may review and analyze information encountered at the border . . .
An advanced search is any search in which an O cer connects external equipment,
through a wired or wireless connection, to an electronic device not merely to gain access
to the device, but to review, copy, and/or analyze its contents.
The directive requires CBP to obtain reasonable suspicion before performing
an advanced search, i.e. an investigative search.  Here, it is clear they are
abiding by Cotterman’s precedent. In Cotterman, the advanced search
occurred when the password-protected  les on Mr. Cotterman’s computer
were accessed by forensic software at the off-site facility.
In sum, the 2018 CBP Directive continues to permit unconstitutional border
searches.  In America, the people are taking a stand. For example, there
has been a recent spike in publications instructing readers on how to protect
their privacy at the border  and privacy complaints continue to be  led
against the Department of Homeland Security.  Even with this resistance,
these constitutional violations are unlikely to stop.  What is the next step?
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed border searches of
electronic devices. In Riley v. California the Court ruled that “a warrant is
generally required before [searching a cell phone], even when a cell phone is
seized incident to arrest.”  The Court recognized that because times have
changed and modern smartphones contain highly private and sensitive data,
the intrusion on privacy today is not limited to physical realities.  Riley
proves that federal courts are at the very least cognizant of the importance
of electronic devices and would be a logical place for the Supreme Court to
start in making future rulings. Until then, however, it is important for lower
courts to take the Cotterman decision one step further and apply the
reasonable suspicion standard to cursory searches of electronic devices.
IV.  Arguments Against Extending Reasonable Suspicion to Cursory
Searches: the Cotterman Dissent
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion in Cotterman lays out three primary











electronic devices: administrative burdens, national security concerns, and
the diminished expectation of privacy at the border.  Although Judge
Smith’s dissent was focused on the reasonable suspicion standard as
applied to investigative searches of electronic devices, the same general
arguments apply with equal force to cursory searches of electronic devices.
A.  The Dangers of Administrative Burdens
The primary argument against extending reasonable suspicion to cursory
searches of electronic devices at the border is that the additional step of
requiring border agents to use their reasonable judgment will create a
potentially dangerous administrative burden.  The dissent in Cotterman
was concerned that “[r]equiring law enforcement to make such complex
legal determinations on the spot, and in the face of potentially grave national
security threats, strips agents of their necessary discretion and deprives
them of an e cient and administrable rule.”
Border agents must rely on their broad discretion without case-by-case
determination of individuals because “[they] process hundreds of thousands
of travelers each day and conduct thousands of searches of electronic
devices each year.”  According to the dissent, forcing agents to comply
with a case-by-case determination to conduct investigative searches of
electronic devices at the border creates an undue burden due to the sheer
number of individuals crossing the border every day.
In practice, however, the reasonable suspicion standard would cause
minimal administrative burdens on border agents while preserving the
critical rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The Cotterman court
best articulated the sentiment when it stated, “[r]easonable suspicion is a
modest, workable standard that is already applied in the extended border
search, Terry stop, and other contexts.”  Continuing, the court explained
that “[i]ts application to the forensic examination here will not impede law
enforcement’s ability to monitor and secure our borders or to conduct
appropriate searches of electronic devices.”
The same can easily be said about cursory examination of electronic
devices. The standard of reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause,
requiring “merely ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting” the
individual is engaging in criminal activity.  Simply requiring border agents
to have some reasonable, objective basis for conducting a cursory search on
a personal electronic device is hardly an administrative burden.
In the world of Constitutional Law, reasonable suspicion is a very moderate
standard. The o cer—or in cases of border searches, border agent—need










conduct. Rather, the agent must assess the totality of the circumstances
and have some suspicion that the traveler coming through the border is
involved in an illegal activity.
The dissent in Cotterman worries that the holding forces agents “to
determine on a case–by–case and moment–by–moment basis whether a
search of digital data remains ‘unintrusive’…or has become ‘comprehensive
and intrusive.’”  A solution is to simply extend reasonable suspicion to
cursory searches of electronic devices. The “complex legal
determination[]”  the dissent seems to be worried about would not exist if
border agents were not required to differentiate between investigative and
cursory searches. Applying the reasonable suspicion standard to both types
of searches clearly eliminates this problem.
B.  The Interest in National Security
The Cotterman dissent also argued that there is an ever-present threat of
terrorists entering the country.  Citing a U.S. Customs and Border
Protection directive, Judge Smith explained that “border searches of
electronic storage devices are ‘essential’ for ‘detect[ing] evidence relating to
terrorism and other national security measures.’”  Further, terrorists tend to
rely on electronic storage devices for a multitude of uses such as copying
and altering passports and other travel documents.  Therefore, “[b]y
providing special privacy protections for electronic devices at the border, the
majority eliminates the powerful deterrent of suspicionless searches and
signi cantly aids” terrorists and criminals.  This sentiment has been
shared among scholars. One law review article suggests that the Cotterman
decision has made it “more di cult for U.S. border agents to combat
terrorism and child pornography” by carving “out a piece of the border search
doctrine.”
Judge Smith predicted that “a reasonable suspicion requirement will likely
disincentivize agents to conduct laptop searches in close cases.”
Theoretically, border agents accused of conducting an unreasonable search
will face “very real consequences” such as the possibility of being sued in
their o cial capacities for civil damages.  By disincentivizing border
agents from conducting searches of electronic devices for fear of reprimand
or legal action against them, the dissent argues that “these misaligned
incentives create unnecessary risk … for our entire nation.”
However, there is no proof that extending reasonable suspicion to cursory
searches, let alone investigative searches, would negatively impact the
e ciency of border agents in carrying out their duties. Requiring the agent to
make a reasonable determination in light of the totality of the circumstances












Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence.”  The border agent simply needs to have “a minimal level of
objective justi cation” for searching the phone.  This standard is
extremely  exible and, at the very least, creates a baseline for Fourth
Amendment protections of electronic devices at the border.
Further, the dissent’s argument that attaching reasonable suspicion to a
border search of an electronic device will somehow disincentivize border
agents from conducting a search in the  rst place is unfounded. Simply
because a border agent must use a minimal level of objective justi cation to
search an electronic device does not mean they will be exposed to legal
consequences. In fact, lawsuits have already been  led against CBP for the
invasive searches conducted on electronic devices even without the
reasonable suspicion standard.
To assert that extending reasonable suspicion to searches of electronic
devices would cause personal reprimand is baseless. If anything, it would
diminish the number of lawsuits against CBP because the standard for
conducting a search would be higher, theoretically resulting in a better-
informed staff of border agents.
C.  The Diminished Expectation of Privacy at the Border
Finally, the dissent in Cotterman suggests that searches of electronic data
have never been immune to the border search exception.  Judge Smith
questioned the privacy of electronic devices to begin with, explaining that
electronic storage devices are “hardly a bastion of privacy” because “they
transmit a massive amount of intimate data to the public on an almost
constant basis.”  According to Judge Smith, due to “the steady erosion of
our privacy on the Internet, searches of electronic storage devices may be
increasingly akin to a well-placed Internet search.”  The dissent asserts
that “[m]apping our privacy rights by the amount of information we carry with
us leads to unreasonable and absurd results.”
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that because “an arrestee has
diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls
out of the picture entirely.”  Further, “not every search ‘is acceptable solely
because a person is in custody.’”  This same logic can be applied to
travelers and border searches of electronic devices. The Cotterman court
explained that “the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices
carries with it a signi cant expectation of privacy and thus renders an
exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other forms of
property.”  There is no reason why this principle should not also apply to











cell phone of an arrestee without a warrant is an unreasonable intrusion into
the arrestee’s constitutional privacy due to the sensitive information
contained on modern smartphones.  It is logical to apply the reasonable
suspicion standard to cursory searches of electronic devices.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”  As the Court explained in Riley, “when ‘privacy-related
concerns are weighty enough’ a ‘search may require a warrant,
notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy’” of the individual.
 Even more so, this Note is not arguing that a warrant is required for a
border search of an electronic device, rather it is arguing that the workable
standard of reasonable suspicion be applied. As the Supreme Court noted in
1990:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the
sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in
quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that
required to show probable cause.
Pursuant to Riley, the privacy-related concerns in an individual’s electronic
device should clearly outweigh the diminished expectation of privacy at the
border.
V.  Solutions and Results
The most effective way to  x this problem is through legislative action.
However, due in large part to partisan politics, the burden of responsibility for
upholding U.S. citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights in cases of electronic
device border searches falls upon the federal courts. As discussed earlier,
CBP’s latest directive was clearly in uenced by the Cotterman decision.  If
courts take the initiative in restoring digital privacy rights by applying the
reasonable suspicion standard to cursory searches of electronic devices,
CBP would abide by that decision. Therefore, while legislative action would
be the most effective and secure way to establish this standard, courts
clearly have the ability to in uence CBP policies.
What would the application of reasonable suspicion to cursory searches of
electronic devices at the border entail? Although reasonable suspicion “is a
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence,” there must still be
some “minimal level of objective justi cation for making the stop.”  In
practice, a border agent would  rst need to assess the totality of the
circumstances, i.e. the entire situation, as opposed to one speci c factor.








objective determination as to whether the particular traveler was engaged in
some type of criminal activity or may be a threat to national security.
For instance, if the agent observes physical manifestations of nervousness
from a particular traveler such as profuse sweating or shaking, that might be
enough to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. The Supreme Court
has noted that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.”  Similarly, if the agent notices strange travel
patterns in the traveler’s documents, that too might be enough to meet the
low standard of reasonable suspicion. Again, reasonable suspicion “does not
deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”  Applying this standard
to cursory searches of electronic devices is a small demand, considering the
privacy rights of U.S. citizens are being infringed upon by border agents on a
daily basis.
VI.  Conclusion
Courts need to extend reasonable suspicion to cursory searches of
electronic devices at the border. Generally speaking, however, that would only
be the start. The border search exception’s detrimental effect on digital
privacy is a stain on the integrity of the Constitution. The exception is a relic
of the past in this age of rapid technological advancement. It clearly requires
a new approach as we store more and more highly sensitive, con dential
data on our phones, laptops, and tablets. At the end of the day, Cotterman
was a strong starting point, but the next logical step is to extend the
reasonable suspicion standard to cursory searches of electronic devices. 
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